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I. INTRODUCTION
The president of a national organization advocating for more diverse
role models in programming once joked, “[T]here actually have been
studies showing there are more extraterrestrials on television than
Latinos.”1 Although intended as a humorous representation of the lack of
minorities in American media, the statement demonstrates the harsh reality
that the media industry often ignores its minority audience. With the
deregulation of media in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the unprecedented
consolidation of American media has narrowed the ability of minority and
nonminority audiences to obtain diverse programming.2 While the FCC has
tried addressing this problem by promoting its policy of expanding
minority ownership of the media,3 heavy deregulation in the last three
decades has resulted in “Big Media” companies consolidating their
ownership across media; this consolidation has “threatened [ ] localism,
diversity, and competition[,]” and has led to a considerable downsizing of
local reporters, editors, and DJs who cater to cities and towns across
America.4
In an age where the next great technological advancement is just five
minutes away, one might think American society has access to a plethora of
information to make us a better-informed public with programming that
appeals to a variety of individuals within the American public. However,
with a few Big Media companies controlling all facets of communication
such as radio, television, cable, newspapers, and the Internet, we are
reading and seeing recycled stories that cater to a majoritarian audience.5 In
1. Gary Dretzka, Left out of the Picture: Young Women Prod TV Executives to
Diversify Programs, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1996, at 1.
2. As shall be elaborated on in Part II, universally defining diversity in the media has
been a major obstacle of this debate. For this Note, diversity means programming that is
inclusive of entertainment and topics of importance to minority audiences.
3. See, e.g., Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 556–66 (1990) (noting that the
FCC “pledged to consider minority ownership as one factor in comparative proceedings for
new licenses[,]” it “outlined a plan to increase minority opportunities to receive reassigned
and transferred licenses through the so-called ‘distress sale’ policy[,]” and it “selected the
minority ownership policies primarily to promote programming diversity”).
4. See ERIC KLINENBERG, FIGHTING FOR AIR: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA’S
MEDIA 26 (2007). “[J]ust as Starbucks knocked out independent coffee shops and Wal-Mart
killed the corner store, media conglomerates have devastated locally produced newspapers,
television stations, and radio programs throughout the country.” Id. at 14.
5. See Robert B. Horwitz, On Media Concentration and the Diversity Question, in
MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS 9, 18 (Philip M. Napoli ed., 2007)
(stating that “[t]he concentration of media ownership has led to more controlled
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order to progress as an inclusive society, we need diverse programming
that exposes all audiences to different perspectives and not just to that of a
nonminority demographic. Although there was hope that deregulating
media ownership would result in an open communication marketplace that
would optimize the number of viewpoints expressed in the media,6 market
forces by themselves have not been able to achieve this “idealized
marketplace of ideas.”7
In order to obtain diversity in the media that is more reflective of our
diverse population8 and that does not neglect the minority audience, the
FCC needs to bring back regulation rather than allow markets to dictate
what best serves the public interest. Although the current policy of the FCC
to promote minority ownership of the media as a way to achieve more
diverse programming is an important policy, it is a policy that has not been
easily achieved and is traditionally criticized for a lack of empirical
evidence demonstrating a nexus between minority ownership and diverse
programming.9 The FCC should look beyond its focus on ownership
regulation to regulations providing for diversified programming and
lowering market control that dictates programming.
information, fewer and less diverse sources of information, and thus less ‘real’ information
despite a purported information overload”).
6. See MARA EINSTEIN, MEDIA DIVERSITY: ECONOMICS, OWNERSHIP, AND THE FCC 1
(2004).
7. Id. at 2.
8. News Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Shows America’s Diversity (Mar.
24,
2011),
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11cn125.html (“Between 2000 and 2010, the Hispanic population grew by 43 percent, rising
from 35.3 million in 2000 to 50.5 million in 2010. . . . [and] compris[ing] 16 percent of the
total U.S. population[;] . . . [t]he black or African-American population totaled 38.9 million
and represented 13 percent of the total population[;] [a]pproximately 14.7 million people
(about 5 percent of all respondents) identified their race as Asian alone[;] . . . Native
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone . . . represented 0.2 percent of the total
population[;] [t]he remainder of respondents who reported only one race, 19.1 million
people (6 percent of all respondents), were classified as ‘some other race’ alone[;] [and]
[n]ine million people reported more than one race in the 2010 Census and made up about 3
percent of the total population.”).
9. See, e.g., Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 355 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (stating that although the Supreme Court in Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990), found that Congress “produced adequate evidence of a nexus between minority
ownership and programming that reflects a minority viewpoint . . . [the Court] never
explained why it was in the government’s interest to encourage the notion that minorities
have racially based views). The Lutheran Court stated, “We do not mean to suggest that
race has no correlation with a person’s tastes or opinions. We doubt, however, that the
Constitution permits the government to take account of racially based differences, much less
encourage them.” Id.; see also Laurie Mason, Christine M. Bachen & Stephanie L. Craft,
Support for FCC Minority Ownership Policy: How Broadcast Station Owner Race or
Ethnicity Affects News and Public Affairs Programming Diversity, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 37,
44 (noting that “social science research addressing the relationship between ownership and
programming is neither voluminous nor consistent”).
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This Note considers the current media ownership regulation scheme
and provides possible solutions that will enhance programming that serves
minority and nonminority audiences alike. Part II describes the historical
development of diversity in the media through landmark cases, such as
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,10 and
the consolidating effects of the Telecommunications Act of 199611 and the
FCC’s 2003 Report and Order,12 which yielded backlash from critics and
the courts in Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications
13
Commission. Part III analyzes the present discontent with programming
that lacks diverse perspectives in the media and the shortage of alternatives
despite technological growth. It proposes that bringing back a regulatory
approach will increase the availability of diverse programming that is
inclusive of minority audiences more so than the current market approach
regime we have seen for the past three decades. Part IV concludes that the
FCC needs to bring back regulation that continues minority ownership
policies and introduces standards that require broadcasters to ascertain the
needs of the communities they serve so that advertisers are not the sole
dictators of programming.

II. HISTORY OF DIVERSITY AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE MEDIA
A.

Early Notions and Development of Diversity

In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress granted the FCC the
authority to grant broadcasting licenses based on “public convenience,
interest, or necessity.”14 Diversity has since been viewed as one of the goals
of the FCC as it exercises its authority over regulating media because an
essential component of serving the public interest “has meant providing a
diversity of viewpoints through the broadcast spectrum.”15 A major
obstacle in the diversity discussion has been the inability of policymakers,
scholars, the courts, or content providers to develop a universal definition
of diversity due to the fact that regulating content conflicts with the First
Amendment.16 Therefore, policymakers often use “structural diversity, that
is diversity of media ownership or diversity of producers,” as a way to
10. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
11. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56
(codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
12. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review–Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
18 F.C.C.R. 13620 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Report and Order].
13. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (2005).
14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 303 (2006).
15. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 9.
16. Id. at 6.
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reach diversity in programming.17
Diversity in the media has seen an evolution of different focuses
based on the FCC’s media policy. Three general concepts of diversity often
utilized by the FCC are product diversity (referring to different program
types), source diversity (referring to the ownership structure), and
viewpoint diversity (referring to different perspectives concerning
important issues).18 Within traditional notions of source and viewpoint
diversity, there has often been a concern about imposing the political and
economic power of a single media owner onto the beliefs of voters.19
Regardless of the number of characterizations of diversity, the main goal of
diversity in the media is to provide more programming options containing
multiple perspectives for all audiences to enjoy.
Notions of diversity can be traced to the idea that communications
media is a marketplace of ideas. In order to ensure that the marketplace of
ideas flourishes in broadcast media, the government set ownership limits in
its licensing process when granting broadcast frequencies to private
parties.20 Early licensing schemes attempted to limit problems, such as the
monopolization of local media through common ownership of broadcast
and newspapers, in order to allow greater access to viewpoints.21 These
principles were largely derived from the Fairness Doctrine.22
The Fairness Doctrine was established in 1949 by the FCC23 in order
to “codify the principle that broadcast media should offer a range of
viewpoints to ensure that a scarcity of broadcast licenses would not result
in a lack of diversity in the marketplace of ideas.”24 Two prongs that
developed out of the FCC Report that came to be known as the Fairness
Doctrine required broadcasters “to devote a significant amount of time to
coverage of issues of public importance, and . . . to provide reasonably
comparable exposure to significant contrasting viewpoints.”25 Although the
17. Id.
18. Peter J. Alexander & Brendan M. Cunningham, Public and Private Decision
Making: The Value of Diversity in News, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING
AND METRICS, supra note 5, at 79, 81.
19. See id.
20. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 26.
21. Id.
22. See David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the “New Media”—New
Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 205 (1979) (“The
most notorious vehicle for promoting diversity has been the fairness doctrine. The rationale
behind the fairness doctrine was to limit the ability of a broadcaster to use his quasimonopoly position to promote only a single side of an important public issue.”).
23. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
24. JOSH SILVER & MARVIN AMMORI, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE DISTRACTION 3,
http://www.freepress.net/files/fp-FairnessDoctrine.pdf.
25. Id.
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Supreme Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. Federal Communications Commission,26 the Fairness Doctrine was
criticized because of concerns that it led to censorship.27
In the early 1980s, the FCC, spearheaded by President Reagan’s
appointee, Chairman Mark Fowler, reconsidered its position towards the
Fairness Doctrine and it “urged Congress to repeal the Commission’s
statutory authority to impose fairness obligations and equal time duties
upon federal licensees.”28 Since Congress did not respond to the proposal,
the FCC “initiated a comprehensive review of the Fairness Doctrine[,]” and
by 1985 it released a report that questioned the necessity of the Fairness
Doctrine, which signaled the FCC’s shift from a regulatory approach to a
deregulatory market approach:29
[W]e conclude that the fairness doctrine is no longer a necessary or
appropriate means by which to effectuate [the public] interest. We
believe that the interest of the public in viewpoint diversity is fully
served by the multiplicity of voices in the marketplace today and that
the intrusion by government into the content of programming
occasioned by the enforcement of the doctrine unnecessarily restricts
the journalistic freedom of broadcasters. Furthermore, we find that the
fairness doctrine, in operation, actually inhibits the presentation of
controversial issues of public importance to the detriment of the public
and in degradation of the editorial prerogative of broadcast
journalists.30

Eventually in 1987, the Fairness Doctrine was repealed “after the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded a Fairness Doctrine case to
the [FCC.]”31 Although Congress attempted to reinstate the Fairness
Doctrine, President Ronald Reagan vetoed the attempt, and the Fairness
Doctrine has remained dead law.32
26. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
27. See SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 5; see, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 22, at
205–06 (discussing how the Fairness Doctrine has not promoted diversity and has
essentially “plac[ed] a government editor in the programmer’s booth”); Inquiry into Section
73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness
Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, para. 1 (1985)
(calling into question the Fairness Doctrine as having “an impermissible chilling effect on
the free expression of ideas”) (internal quotation omitted) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness
Report].
28. R. Randall Rainey, The Public’s Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic
Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties
of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 293–94 (1993).
29. Id. at 294–95.
30. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 27, at para. 5; see also EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at
23–24 (citing Enver Masud, Broadcasting Fairness Doctrine Promised Balanced Coverage,
WISDOM FUND (July 25, 1997), http://www.twf.org/News/Y1997/Fairness.html).
31. See SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 3; Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr v.
FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 502–03 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
32. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 3.

Number 3]

OVERWHELMED BY BIG CONSOLIDATION

739

Despite the rise and fall of the Fairness Doctrine, concerns for
diversity in the media remained prominent and found growth in the 1960s
during the civil rights era. A reform movement developed in the 1960s
pushing the FCC to be more in tune with the public interest standard of the
Communications Act of 1934 by encouraging broadcasters to air content
that was important to minority audiences and to hire minorities to work at
broadcast stations.33 The lack of minorities in ownership, programming,
and broadcast employment was a catalyst for FCC regulations addressing
diversity, such as ascertainment requirements that required “licensees to
‘ascertain’ the communities to which they broadcast and to air
programming relevant to these ascertained local community concerns.”34 In
1960, the FCC adopted the Report and Statement of Policy Res:
Commission en banc Programming Inquiry,35 which set fourteen criteria for
broadcasters to use to determine the needs of the communities they served
and how to develop programming that served those needs.36 These
ascertainment requirements gave broadcasters a standard to follow to
ensure they were serving the public interest.
In 1973, the FCC began considering minority ownership as a factor in
comparative hearings for broadcast license applications as a way to
introduce more diversity into the media.37 Previously, the FCC considered
race only if the licensing applicant could prove that his or her race would
enhance diversity in programming.38 However, minority ownership was
virtually nonexistent by 1971, with only ten out of approximately 7,500
radio stations being minority-owned and none of the 1,000 television
stations owned by minorities.39 Questions of minority ownership reached
the courts in TV 9, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,40 in which
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the racial identity of an
applicant for a radio license was relevant when choosing between
33. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 27.
34. Id.
35. Public Notice, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
36. The fourteen criteria listed in the 1960 Programming Policy Statement were the
following: “(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of local
talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational programs, (6)
public affairs programs, (7) editorialization by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9)
agricultural programs, (1[0]) news programs[,] (11) weather and market reports, (12) sports
programs, (13) service to minority groups, [and] (14) entertainment programs.” Id. at 2314;
see also Carolyn M. Byerly, Professor, Dep’t of Journalism, JHJ Sch. of Comm., Howard
Univ., Statement to Participants and Audience at Media Ownership Workshop on Diversity
Issues: GenderǦandǦRaceǦConscious Research Toward Egalitarian Broadcast Ownership
Regulation 2 (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/workshop-012710/byerly.pdf.
37. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 28.
38. Id.
39. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
40. Id.
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applicants.41 With the court finding that minority ownership could result in
more diverse programming, the FCC began giving “evaluation
enhancement[s] in comparative hearings to minority ownership and
participation in station management by members of minority groups.”42
In 1978, the FCC further addressed diversity concerns through its
Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities,43
which provided for a minority tax certificate program44 and a distress sale
program45 to encourage existing broadcast property to be sold to minorities.
Despite more race-neutral measures to increase the opportunities of
minorities in the equal employment context and with its community
ascertainment requirements, the FCC felt that the views of minorities46
were not adequately represented in broadcast media, which was a
disservice to the interest of the minority audience and to that of the general
public.47
The FCC noted that having diversified programming was a key
objective of the Communications Act of 1934 and of the First Amendment,
and aside from serving the minority audience such programming “also
enriches and educates the non-minority audience.”48 To assist in the
diversification of the media, the FCC believed that minority ownership was
the key to including minority viewpoints in programming.49 The FCC
further noted that just because an applicant proposes to present the views of
minority groups in their programming, it “does not offset the fact that it is
upon ownership that public policy places primary reliance with respect to
diversification of content, and that historically has proved to be
significantly influential with respect to editorial comment and the
41. Id. at 937; see also Horwitz, supra note 5, at 28.
42. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 28.
43. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, Public
Notice, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Statement of Policy].
44. Id. at 983; see also Christine M. Bachen et al., Serving the Public Interest:
Broadcast News, Public Affairs Programming, and the Case for Minority Ownership, in
MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS, supra note 5, at 269, 285 (“[T]he
FCC awarded a certificate allowing capital gains taxes to be deferred when a broadcast or
cable system owner elected to sell their license to minority owned or controlled entities or
entrepreneurs.”).
45. 1978 Statement of Policy, supra note 43, at 983; see also Bachen et al., supra note
44, at 284–85 (“[T]he FCC allowed a broadcast licensee that had been designated for
hearing because of an issue that disqualified it from controlling a license, to sell its license
to a minority owned firm to avoid the loss of value of the license.”).
46. The FCC defined minorities to include “those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed,
American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction.” 1978
Statement of Policy, supra note 43, at 980 n.8.
47. Id. at 980–81.
48. Id. at 981.
49. Id.
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presentation of news.”50
While remaining cautious of not overstepping censorship of broadcast
speech and the editorial function of a broadcast license, the FCC developed
minority ownership policies in order to expand broadcast diversity.51
Essentially, the FCC would give a “plus” to applicants that were at least in
part minority owned or managed when awarding initial broadcast
licenses.52 Ultimately, these FCC policies were legitimated based on the
presumption that there was a “connection between ownership diversity and
. . . program and viewpoint diversity.”53 As a result of FCC minority
ownership policies, there was an increase of minority ownership in the
approximately 12,000 radio and 1,200 television stations from around 1 %
to 3.5 % in the years between 1978 to 1990.54 In addition, during this time
the diversity rationale for increasing minority ownership received both
judicial and congressional approval.55

B. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission and the Following Stagnation of Minority Ownership
Although there are different types of diversity, viewpoint diversity in
programming seemed to be the aim of the ownership policies of the
1970s.56 Since direct regulation of viewpoint diversity conflicts with
anticensorship principles of the First Amendment and the Communications
Act of the 1934, the FCC regulated ownership diversity as a way to
indirectly regulate viewpoint diversity.57 However, questions about the
indirect use of ownership diversity to reach viewpoint diversity surfaced in
the courts and changed the direction of minority ownership policies.
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission58 addressed challenges of FCC policies
regarding awarding enhancement for minority ownership in comparative
50. Id. at 982 (quoting TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
51. See Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 284–85.
52. Id. at 284. The FCC would consider six factors when comparing mutually exclusive
new broadcast license applications: diversification of control of mass media
communications, full-time participation in station operation by owners, proposed program
service, past broadcast record, efficient use of the frequency, and the character of the
applicants. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Public Notice, 1
F.C.C.2d 393, 394–99 (1965); W. Mich. Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 604–05, 615
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (arguing that minority ownership and participation is a “plus” factor to be
considered with all other factors).
53. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 29.
54. Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 285.
55. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 30.
56. Id. at 29.
57. Id. at 30.
58. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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hearings for new licenses and the minority distress sale program.59 Noting
that the FCC’s minority ownership programs had been specifically
approved and mandated by Congress60 and that an integral part of the
FCC’s mission is to safeguard the public’s right to receive diverse views
and information,61 the Court held:
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress—even if those
measures are not “remedial” in the sense of being designed to
compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination—
are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.62

Under this intermediate scrutiny standard, the Court found that the minority
ownership policies served an “important governmental objective of
broadcast diversity” and that they were “substantially related to the
achievement of that objective.”63
The Court ultimately ruled that “[t]he FCC’s conclusion that there is
an empirical nexus between minority ownership and broadcasting diversity
is a product of its expertise, and we accord its judgment
deference.”64Addressing the argument that the assumption that minority
ownership will produce diverse viewpoints and programming was a
stereotype, the Court noted:
Rather, both Congress and the FCC maintain simply that expanded
minority ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggregate, result in
greater broadcast diversity. A broadcasting industry with representative
minority participation will produce more variation and diversity than
will one whose ownership is drawn from a single racially and
ethnically homogeneous group.65

The Court drew the following analogy between affirmative action
jurisprudence and the diversification of media:
Just as a “diverse student body” contributing to a “‘robust exchange of
ideas’” is a “constitutionally permissible goal” on which a raceconscious university admissions program may be predicated, the
diversity of views and information on the airwaves serves important
First Amendment values.66

Furthermore, the Court noted that empirical evidence demonstrated that
minority ownership influenced the selection of topics for news coverage
and editorial views, especially when it came to matters of concern for
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 547.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 564–65 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 566.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 568 (internal citations omitted).
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minorities.67
Although the majority decision in Metro Broadcasting upheld the
FCC minority ownership policies, it was Justice O’Connor’s dissent that
provided the framework for later cases reversing minority preferences and
criticized the logic of the diversity rationale in broadcasting.68 Justice
O’Connor believed the majority was departing from equal protection
jurisprudence because any racial classification, regardless of whether it was
deemed as benign, should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.69 She also
disagreed with the majority’s assumption that individuals think a certain
way because of their race.70 Justice O’Connor felt that the minority
ownership programs provided benefits to some members of society while
denying other members the same benefits based on the individual’s race or
ethnicity, and that this process would lead to stigmatization of these groups
because individuals would not be rewarded based on individual merit.71
Furthermore, she noted that the FCC had not implemented these procedures
as remedial measures for past discrimination and that they were not
narrowly tailored to remedy identified discrimination.72 Ultimately, Justice
O’Connor cast doubt on the assumption that diverse ownership would
produce diverse viewpoints, therefore rejecting the nexus argument
between an owner’s race and diverse programming.73
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Metro Broadcasting effectively
changed future analysis of minority preference programs. Her analysis
provided the framework for the majority opinion in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,74 which held that all racial classifications, even benign ones
imposed by government action, would trigger strict scrutiny.75 Although
Adarand overruled the intermediate scrutiny standard of Metro
Broadcasting, the permissibility of the diversity rationale of Metro
Broadcasting was not addressed.76 However, later cases continued to cut
67. Id. at 580–81.
68. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 32.
69. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602–03, 609–10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“‘Strict scrutiny’ requires that, to be upheld, racial classifications must be determined to be
necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”).
70. Id. at 602–03.
71. Id. at 604.
72. Id. at 611–12 (“Under the appropriate standard, strict scrutiny, only a compelling
interest may support the Government's use of racial classifications. Modern equal protection
doctrine has recognized only one such interest: remedying the effects of racial
discrimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not
a compelling interest.”).
73. Id. at 626–27.
74. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
75. Id. at 201–02.
76. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; see also Horwitz, supra note 5, at 35.
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down the diversity rationale,77 and due to the lack of empirical evidence
concerning the nexus between diverse ownership and diverse
programming, minority ownership policies were seen “as violat[ing] [ ] the
speech rights of corporations.”78

C.

Furthering Consolidation: The Telecommunications Act of 1996
and the FCC 2003 Report and Order

Ownership limits have been used by the FCC to control media
consolidation since the FCC’s inception; however, the last three decades
have seen a relaxation of these ownership limits. A reason for this
deregulation stemmed from the tremendous growth of media outlets in the
1980s and 1990s due to technological changes, such as the advancement of
cable television and direct broadcast satellite, which put economic stress on
more traditional media like radio and broadcast television since they were
competing for the same audience and advertisers.79 Because alternatives to
more traditional media like broadcast television and radio were causing
advertising dollars to shift to cable as cable is more efficient at providing
advertisers with a more concentrated audience of a particular
demographic,80 the FCC stepped in to ensure the viability of more
traditional media by allowing multiple station ownership in order to
produce “economies of scale that significantly reduce overhead.”81
Between the 1950s and the enactment of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (1996 Act), the landscape of ownership limits transformed
tremendously:
From 1954 to 1984, the FCC limited national ownership to seven
stations, where each station was in a separate geographic market. In
1984, the FCC expanded ownership limits to 12 stations, provided that
the total number of stations owned did not reach over 25% of the
national market. The 1996 Telecommunications Act raised the
broadcast television ownership limit to 35% of the national market and

77. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (1998) (noting that
even if the Court in Metro Broadcasting held that “the diversity interest was ‘important[,]’”
the Lutheran Court did “not think diversity can be elevated to the ‘compelling’ level
[required by the Adarand decision], particularly when the Court has given every indication
of wanting to cut back Metro Broadcasting”); Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d
1027, 1052 (2002) (concluding that the FCC’s “diversity rationale for retaining the
[Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership] Rule is woefully inadequate”).
78. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 38.
79. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 17, 112. Also in the 1980s, television saw the addition of
the first new network in fifty years with the Fox broadcast network. The addition of Fox and
the growth of cable brought considerable competition for ABC, CBS, and NBC with strong
competition not only from the growth of cable, but also from the formidable competitor Fox.
Id. at 112.
80. Id. at 122.
81. Id. at 18.
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eliminated the station ownership limit.82

As a result of the relaxation in ownership limits, traditional broadcast
networks began to buy and create cable networks in a horizontal integration
strategy83 that resulted in massive consolidation of traditional and new
technology in the media industry. This led companies like AOL/Time
Warner Inc., The Walt Disney Company, and Viacom to become
multinational media conglomerates that had their hand not only in
broadcast and cable television, but also in the Internet, magazine, music,
and retail industries.84
The 1996 Act amended the Communications Act of 1934. With the
passage of the 1996 Act, section 202(h) required that the FCC “review its
media ownership rules biennially ‘to determine whether any of such rules
are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.’”85 In 2004,
Congress amended the biennial review requirement in the 1996 Act so that
reviews occur quadrennially and that the review does not include the
national television multiple ownership review.86 The 1996 Act further
provided that, in designing competitive bidding systems, the FCC would
consider public interest objectives such as:
promoting economic opportunity and competition and ensuring that
new and innovative technologies are readily accessible to the
American people by avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and
by disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants,
including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses
owned by members of minority groups and women.87

Although the language in the 1996 Act made it seem as if it were a
proponent of minority ownership, the massive media consolidation
resulting from the 1996 Act completely diminished whatever momentum
previous minority ownership policies had established.
The 1996 Act, coupled with the fact that the FCC abandoned policies
such as the fourteen criteria ascertainment requirements and requirements
for stations to keep program logs to determine whether community
problems and issues were getting program coverage, resulted in lax
82. Alexander & Cunningham, supra note 18, at 79. “Subsequently, the FCC’s decision
in 2000 to retain a national broadcast television ownership limit was challenged by Fox
Television Stations in the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, and the Court reversed the
FCC’s decision, sending the rule back to the FCC for further consideration.” Id. at 79–80.
83. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 128.
84. Id. at 138.
85. MARK LLOYD & PHIL NAPOLI, LOCAL MEDIA DIVERSITY MATTERS: MEASURE MEDIA
DIVERSITY ACCORDING TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES, NOT MARKET VALUES 7 (2007),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/01/pdf/media_diversity.pdf (citing 2003
Report and Order, supra note 12, at para. 56).
86. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3,
97–98 (amending section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B) (2006).
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standards that allowed major corporations to run amok.88 After the 1996
Act was passed, the media industry saw dramatic consolidation with
numerous mergers, acquisitions, and new partnerships resulting from
relaxed ownership limits.89 Big Media companies like Clear Channel,
Viacom, and Disney overtook small broadcasters and minority-owned
stations.90 For those small broadcasters and minority-owned stations that
already had licenses, the 1996 Act allowed “big companies [competing for
the license[s]] [to drag] out the process to weed out the small players.”91 In
addition, the consolidation began eliminating many workers in the
communications industry.92
All mediums in the industry saw their fair share of change. Perhaps
one of the most notable examples of consolidation was in the radio industry
with the rise of nationally syndicated conservative talk radio. Subsequent to
the mergers resulting from a relaxation in ownership caps, nationally
syndicated programming captivated the market, and conservative radio was
one of the first genres to jump on the wagon.93 Since the 1996 Act
eliminated national station ownership limits and raised local radio station
ownership limits from four to eight, Big Media companies such as
Cumulus Media, Viacom/Infinity, and Citadel Broadcasting Corporation
joined Clear Channel in dominating the market.94 Within approximately
two years after ownership limits were relaxed, Big Media companies
bought and sold 4,400 stations out of the 10,400 commercial radio stations
that existed at the time of the Act, which resulted in 700 radio owners
losing their stations—a forty percent reduction in the number of radio
owners.95 Television and cable also followed the radio model in
consolidating the market and reducing the number of small and local
broadcasters.96
However, the story of ownership limits did not end with the 1996 Act.
The FCC’s 2003 Report and Order further relaxed media ownership
regulations.97 Included in the 2003 Report and Order were revisions to the
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, the radio-television cross-

88. See Byerly, supra note 36, at 2.
89. KLINENBERG, supra note 4, at 224.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 58.
92. Id. at 65. For instance, the union AFTRA, a “national labor union representing
journalists, broadcasters, and artists, estimated that [Clear Channel] eliminated between
1,500 and 4,500 positions between 2000 and 2004.” Id.
93. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 4.
94. KLINENBERG, supra note 4, at 27.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 93, 209–10.
97. 2003 Report and Order, supra note 12.
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ownership rule, the local television multiple ownership rule, the national
television ownership cap, and the dual network rule.98 In effect, “the FCC
increased the ownership limit to [forty-five percent] of the national
market.”99 However, the controversy surrounding the relaxed ownership
limits led Congress, in 2004, to step in and set a statutory limit on the
national television ownership rules at thirty-nine percent.100
Although the 2003 Report and Order served a blow to minority
ownership with its relaxation of ownership regulation, the question of
diversity was still on the table. The 2003 Report and Order noted that “[a]
diverse and robust marketplace of ideas is the foundation of our
democracy.”101 In analyzing diversity, the FCC noted five types of
diversity: “viewpoint, outlet, program, source, and minority and female
ownership diversity.”102 These types of diversity are part of media policy
goals that try to achieve fundamental policy goals such as “a more effective
and representative democratic process, economic efficiency, and greater
participation of women and ethnic minorities in economic and political
affairs.”103 The 2003 Report and Order stated, “[e]ncouraging minority and
female ownership historically has been an important Commission
objective, and we reaffirm that goal here.”104 Similar to the ownership
policies of the 1970s, such as the 1978 Statement of Policy on Minority
Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities,105 viewpoint diversity continued to
be a concern as it would contribute to a better-informed citizenry—a
“fundamental policy goal” of the FCC.106
The FCC’s answer to the question of diversity was the development
of the Diversity Index (DI).107 The DI was based on the HerfindahlHirshman Index (HHI) used in antitrust enforcement to measure a firm’s
market concentration for a specific good or service.108 Market

98. Id. at para. 2
99. Alexander & Cunningham, supra note 18, at 80.
100. See id.; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, §
629, 118 Stat. 3, 97 (amending section 202 (c)(1)(B) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996).
101. 2003 Report and Order, supra note 12, at para. 19.
102. Id. at para. 18.
103. Steven S. Wildman, Indexing Diversity, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM:
MEANING AND METRICS, supra note 5, at 151, 158.
104. 2003 Report and Order, supra note 12, at para. 46 (internal citations omitted).
105. 1978 Statement of Policy, supra note 43.
106. Wildman, supra note 103, at 159.
107. 2003 Report and Order, supra note 12, at para. 391. Measuring diversity, although
a very important part of the “diversity in media” discussion, is beyond the scope of this
Note.
108. LLOYD & NAPOLI, supra note 85, at 8; see also Wildman, supra note 103, at 152.
For an explanation of HHI mechanics, see Wildman, supra note 103, at 152–54.
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concentration in the HHI is calculated by “taking the market share of each
firm, squaring it, and then summing the result for all firms.”109 The DI was
“to play a role in assessments of the effect of ownership structure on the
performance of local media markets with respect to certain noneconomic
policy goals analogous to that played by the HHI in antitrust
enforcement.”110
Similar to the HHI, the DI “is a measure of structure rather than a
direct measure of performance with respect to a policy goal,” which
demonstrates the “belief that ownership structure influences
performance.”111 The FCC hoped that the DI would serve as an internal
guide to assess viewpoint diversity while evaluating the status of local
media markets and whether there should be further ownership
consolidation of these markets.112 In using the DI, the FCC “define[s] a
market, measure[s] concentration,” and defines reasons for “rejecting or
accepting mergers.”113 In defining markets, the FCC “had to decide which
media to include and how much weight they should be given.”114

D. Backlash to FCC Actions: Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal
Communications Commission
The 2003 Report and Order faced much criticism despite efforts to
install the DI. What resulted was denouncement across the political
spectrum, limitations enacted by Congress, and eventually the 2003 Report
and Order was remanded for consideration by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit115 in Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal
Communications Commission.116 The court noted that the FCC’s objective
in setting licensing policies has “long acted on the theory that
diversification of mass media ownership serves the public interest by
promoting diversity of program and service viewpoints, as well as by
preventing undue concentration of economic power.”117 However, the court
found that the FCC had not “sufficiently justified its particular chosen
numerical limits for local television ownership, local radio ownership, and
109. Mark Cooper, When Law and Social Science Go Hand in Glove: Usage and
Importance of Local and National News Sources—Critical Questions and Answers for
Media Market Analysis, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS, supra
note 5, at 193, 200.
110. Wildman, supra note 103, at 151.
111. Id. at 153.
112. LLOYD & NAPOLI, supra note 85, at 7–8.
113. Cooper, supra note 109, at 202.
114. Id.
115. LLOYD & NAPOLI, supra note 85, at 7.
116. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1123 (2005).
117. Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 383 (citing FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm.
for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978)).
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cross-ownership of media within local markets.”118
The court remanded the 2003 Report and Order to the FCC because
the FCC “gave too much weight to the Internet as a media outlet,
irrationally assigned outlets of the same media type equal market shares,
and inconsistently derived the Cross-Media Limits from its Diversity Index
results.”119 The court noted that diversity comes from independent news
sources and that it was inconsistent for the FCC to include the Internet in
its DI but leave out cable television because most websites would not be
considered independent news sources for local news any more than local
news “retransmitted broadcast stations could be counted as cable-provided
news.”120 In addition, the court found the assumption of equal market
shares among all outlets within the same media type to be inconsistent with
the FCC’s “overall approach to its Diversity Index and also makes
unrealistic assumptions about media outlets’ relative contributions to
viewpoint diversity in local markets.”121 The court pushed for the FCC to
“measure media audiences, assess media usage, and apply a rigorous
understanding of the function of media in democracy.”122
In response to the backlash received with regard to its diversity
efforts, the FCC engaged in numerous studies to analyze issues relating to
market entry barriers that affect minority media owners, such as: licensing,
programming, advertising, and access to capital.123 After various rounds of
seeking comment, the FCC adopted the 2008 Broadcast Diversity Order.124
The 2008 Broadcast Diversity Order adopted thirteen proposals to improve
diversity efforts, such as the advertising nondiscrimination rule125 (also
known as the ban on “no urban/no Spanish” dictates)126 and establishing
policies that encourage growth of “eligible entities” that were to benefit
118. Id. at 382.
119. Id. at 403.
120. Wildman, supra note 103, at 156; see also Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at
405–07.
121. Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 408.
122. Cooper, supra note 109, at 194.
123. Memorandum from the Minority Media and Telecomm. Council on the FCC’s
Ability to Rely Upon Previous Adarand Studies to Henry M. Rivera, Chair, FCC Advisory
Comm. on Diversity for Commun. in the Digital Age (May 5, 2009),
http://www.fcc.gov/DiversityFAC/050709/adarand-status-050509.pdf (citation omitted).
Examples of such studies may be found at Policy Forum on Market Entry Barriers, FCC
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES (Dec. 12, 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/opportunity/meb_study/, and
FCC Presented with Advertising Study Which Reveals a Tale of Two Systems, FCC,
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Informal/ad-study/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
124. Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcast Services, Report and
Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 23 F.C.C.R. 5922 (2008)
[hereinafter 2008 Broadcast Diversity Order].
125. Id. at paras. 49–50.
126. Id.
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under the Order (including reviving a distress sale policy and making rules
encouraging investment in “eligible entities”).127 However, the FCC is still
working on and seeking comment on new regulations that will help with
implementing these proposals.128
The consolidation of the media industry resulting from the 1996 Act
and the FCC’s 2003 Report and Order changed the landscape for diversity
in the media. Although the FCC has addressed the issue of diversity by
establishing policies that promote minority ownership, minority owners
have not been able to compete in this consolidated market. Regardless of
whether one believes this has contributed to the lack of diverse
programming serving minority audiences, this history shapes the diversity
debate and the future of diversifying the media.

III. THE FUTURE OF DIVERSITY IN THE MEDIA
A.

Should We Have Diversity in Ownership of the Media?

The current status of media was illustrated by Josh Silver, executive
director of Free Press:
We now have a political system run by big money and a media
controlled by big corporations that are happy to keep Americans
uninformed about the bread-and-butter issues that affect us most. You
can’t have democracy without an educated public, and you can’t have
an educated public with the media ownership structure we have
today.129

As the 1978 Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting
Facilities noted, minority ownership is important because it helps to
“serve[] not only the needs and interests of the minority community but
also enriches and educates the non-minority audience.”130 As Mr. Silver’s
comment demonstrates, today’s broadcast media fall short of providing
adequate programming to fulfill such an objective.
For example, in the instance of broadcast and cable television, both
are silent on issues regarding minority concerns and often engage in
stereotypes of minorities in their program portrayals.131 Typically, news
coverage concerning minorities is limited to certain activities or concerns,
127. See id. at paras. 35–39. “Eligible entities” are defined as “any entity that would
qualify as a small business consistent with Small Business Administration (“SBA”)
standards for its industry grouping, based on revenue.” Id. at para 6.
128. See infra part III.A.
129. KLINENBERG, supra note 4, at 221.
130. 1978 Statement of Policy, supra note 43, at 981.
131. See Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of
Color by the Broadcast Networks in Prime Time Entertainment Programming, in MEDIA
DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS, supra note 5, at 227, 248 [hereinafter
White Out]; see also Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 274.
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and it often portrays minorities as “a threat or social burden” to society.132
Studies demonstrate that “television news constrains White viewers’
perceptions and attitudes of minorities, and, more broadly, the policies and
programs they are likely to support.” 133
In addition, programming geared toward a minority audience has
traditionally been very limited in broadcast and cable television. In
broadcast television, the major networks have often shied away from more
minority or urban programming.134 One potential reason for this is that
networks traditionally want to produce less expensive programming that
they can more likely syndicate.135 Although cable may be deemed to
provide more options for all viewers, these options are considerably limited
in number for minority viewers compared to the options of nonminority
audiences, even on regular broadcast television.136 For example, “Black
Entertainment Television (BET), which used to be a black-owned
company,137 has primarily black-oriented programming, and has been
criticized for mostly playing music videos . . . . and recycled sitcoms.”138 In
addition, although Latinos are deemed to have more viewing options (like
Univision and Telemundo) than African Americans, Latino viewing
options are “often broadcast only in Spanish” (therefore excluding North
American Latinos who do not speak Spanish) and that mergers in the
industry have left “fewer Latino voices . . . on the air.”139
132. Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 282.
133. Id. at 280 (relying on a study by Franklin D. Gilliam & Shanto Iyengar, Prime
Supspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 560 (2000), which found that local television news broadcasts depicting African
Americans committing crimes create bias among White viewers).
134. See, e.g., Leonard M. Baynes, Race, Media Consolidation, and Online Content: The
Lack of Substitutes Available to Media Consumers of Color, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 199,
207–08 (2006) (noting that the “majority-owned television networks [ABC, CBS, FOX, and
NBC] fail to provide sufficient diversity,” and that despite their attempts in the early 2000s
at diversifying programming, “[m]ost of the ‘gains’ in diversity resulted from an increase in
non-recurring and secondary roles, not in starring roles”). Despite some progress in the early
2000s, there were “fewer scripted all-African American or all-Latino/a shows . . . broadcast
in the 2004–2005 season than in the previous season . . . . [and the] percentage of
Asian/Pacific Island characters on primetime television remained small and unchanged . . . .
[with] Arab American, Asian Indian, Pakistani, and American Indian characters [being]
virtually nonexistent.” Id. at 208–09. Although smaller networks in the 1990s, such as UPN
and the WB, started out targeting more urban audiences that included more minorities, these
networks shifted programming with “the WB programs . . . targeted more towards young,
White audiences, and the UPN Black-oriented shows were segregated to Monday nights.”
White Out, supra note 131, at 228.
135. See generally EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 166.
136. See White Out, supra note 131, at 248.
137. Id. BET’s founder Robert Johnson sold BET to Viacom for $2 billion. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 249 (“In 2003, the FCC approved a merger between Univision and Hispanic
Broadcasting. The deal created a Hispanic media conglomerate, which controls 63 of 65
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Considering the current lack of minority programming, how can
minority ownership ensure that programming formats provide viewpoint
diversity to both minority and nonminority audiences? Although there is
not a lot of empirical evidence concerning the nexus between minority
ownership and broadcast diversity, some studies do indicate an increase in
broadcast diversity when there is minority ownership of media in
communities with larger minority populations.140 Studies demonstrate that
minority ownership, especially in radio stations, differs in programming
and in news focus from majority-owned stations.141 For instance, minorityowned radio stations are more likely to choose program formats that
provide news and public affairs programming that are of importance and
concern to minority communities.142 For example, Black radio stations have
been historically known to play an active role in community affairs and
serve to unify African American audiences, especially in promoting
political activism in the community and acting as a forum in critical social
eras.143 Yet, studies also show that “the targeting of local programming to
minority viewers is much greater in markets with larger minority
populations.”144
However, given Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Metro Broadcasting
and her concern that we may be violating the Equal Protection Clause by
making racial distinctions in regards to minority ownership policies, should
we assume that just because one is a minority owner then he or she will
broadcast information promoting diverse viewpoints? Although minority
ownership does not guarantee diverse viewpoints, studies demonstrate that
minority ownership rather “assure[s] the existence of a particular racebased viewpoint on the part of the station owner, [and] what is in fact
realized is a sensitivity to and appreciation for minority or ethnic
preferences and viewpoints that allows for their articulation as part of the
marketplace of ideas.”145 Although minority ownership does not guarantee
diverse programming and sharing of diverse viewpoints, it does raise the
likelihood of minority audiences being served.
Even if the FCC were able to provide for more minority ownership in
broadcast, would its regulations pass under the strict scrutiny standard for
racial classifications advanced in Adarand? Legal logic from the
affirmative action realm may be able to provide some guidance for this
radio stations owned by Hispanic Broadcasting, two broadcast television networks, one
cable network, one record label, and 53 television stations.”).
140. See Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 291–92.
141. Id. at 292.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 279.
144. Id. at 294.
145. Id. at 296.
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problem. In Grutter v. Bollinger,146 the Supreme Court found that diversity
is a compelling state interest when looking at “race-based governmental
action in the context of equal protection jurisprudence.”147 Grutter, which
involved higher education, held that “race may be a factor in admitting law
students to promote diversity in the educational setting and better prepare
students for the workforce . . . .”148
Even though Grutter dealt with a state action, the diversity rationale
of the Court has application to broadcast. Like promoting the diversity
dialogue in schools, the diversity dialogue can be important to broadcast
and in the marketplace of ideas.149 The diversity dialogue in higher
education allows students to learn different viewpoints from one another.
Likewise, increasing minority ownership also increases the pool of
viewpoints in broadcast and allows for more ideas to be experienced by
minority and nonminority audiences. The relationship between educational
goals and broadcasting roles should be realized because “[b]roadcasting
shapes cross-racial and ethnic understanding and may expose the American
public to the existence of an increasingly diverse society and world.”150
Therefore, this diversity logic from the affirmative action context should be
utilized by the FCC in formulating minority ownership policies.
Although minority ownership policies should not remain the sole
focus of the FCC as a way to achieve more diverse programming, it is still
an important policy that is currently being pursued by the FCC. The FCC’s
Advisory Committee on Diversity for Communications in the Digital Age
(Advisory Committee) formally recommended on October 14, 2010, that
the FCC undergo a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to consider how to
adopt a new preference program for its competitive bidding process in
spectrum auctions.151 On December 2, 2010, Chairman Julius Genachowski
released a Public Notice requesting comment based on the Advisory
Committee’s recommendations.152 According to the Public Notice:
Under the proposed preference, persons or entities who have overcome
substantial disadvantage would be eligible for a bidding credit. The
Advisory Committee explains that the new preference “would expand
146. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
147. Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 288; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345; see Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 288.
149. See Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 288.
150. Id. at 291.
151. Transcript of Diversity Federal Advisory Committee Meeting (Oct. 14, 2010),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/DiversityFAC/meeting101410.html (click on “Word” or
“Acrobat” hyperlink).
152. Public Notice, Media and Wireless Telecommunications Bureaus Seek Comment on
Recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Diversity for Communications in the
Digital Age for a New Auction Preference for Overcoming Disadvantage, FCC GN Docket
No. 10-244 (rel. Dec. 2, 2010).
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the pool of designated entities to include those qualified applicants
who have overcome substantial disadvantage,” noting that the
proposed program is analogous in some respects to programs used by
educational institutions in their admissions processes.153

These designated entity rules from the proposals would benefit auction
bidders who have “overcome a disadvantage, such as a disability or a
minority or low-income background,” and “would thereby help to level the
playing field.”154 In addition, as recognized by Commissioner Robert
McDowell, the FCC is currently considering possibly replacing the
“eligible entities” definition used in the 2008 Broadcast Diversity Order
“with a new concept that more directly addresses race and gender
classifications”; however, doing so “must satisfy the rigorous demands of
the Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted under the Supreme Court’s
Adarand line of cases.”155
Although there is not strong empirical evidence that there is a direct
link between minority ownership and diverse programming, minority
ownership is believed to improve the likelihood of diverse programming in
the aggregate. As the Court in Metro Broadcasting emphasized, we should
defer to the FCC’s expertise on this matter and its historical belief that
diverse media ownership does allow more ideas to be introduced into the
marketplace of ideas. Diversified programming has traditionally been
viewed by the FCC as a key objective of the Communications Act of 1934
and the First Amendment, and we should defer to the FCC’s goals to
enhance diversified programming through its minority ownership policies
because of this tradition and historical belief. However, at the same time
the FCC needs to expand its focus and introduce regulations that further
improve the achievement of diverse programming.

B.

Could the Internet Serve As a Substitute for Diverse
Programming?

Although there are arguments that because of the Internet we have
access to many diverse viewpoints at any given moment, the Internet can
hardly serve as a substitute for diverse programming that will serve
minority audiences. While diverse viewpoints may be more easily
expressed through the Internet because of fewer barriers from pressures of

153. Id. at 1.
154. Press Release, Media Access Project, MAP Congratulates FCC for Helping to
Enhance Diversity in Telecommunications and Media (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://www.mediaaccess.org/2010/12/map-congratulates-fcc-for-helping-to-enhancediversity-in-telecommunications-and-media/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
155. Commissioner Robert M. McDowell, Remarks to the Advisory Committee on
Diversity in Communications for the Digital Age 2 (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1202/DOC-303198A1.pdf.
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economic markets and Big Media companies, there are still barriers for
minority audiences and for acquiring information of interest. Although
broadband connection to the Internet in the home has increased from ten
percent in 2000 to over eighty percent in 2009, web users’ confidence in
the reliability of the Internet has declined from fifty-five percent in 2000 to
thirty-nine percent in 2009.156 In addition, there are still problems of
computer literacy, which lead to “exacerbat[ing] inequalities among
American communities.”157 Therefore, until problems of reliability and
computer literacy are remedied, diverse viewpoints will have a difficult
time reaching minority and nonminority audiences who may not have
computer literacy or Internet access.
In addition, the Internet, although an expansive source, can be
described as the “antilocal medium” because it connects us to places far
away.158 The Internet is largely dominated by Big Media that recycles its
broadcast and news sources on their websites, which are relied upon by
other websites for information:159
The majority of online news content consists of repackaged wire
service articles and syndicated newspaper stories, and most daily
newspapers use the Web primarily to republish print articles rather
than offering interactive or multimedia products. New media giants
such as Yahoo, AOL, and IBS rely almost entirely on news supplied by
other organizations, while bland, brief stories from wire services such
as the Associated Press and Reuters constitute about three-fourths of
the content at ABC.com and three-fifths of the content at both Fox.com
and MSNBC.com.160

Although there is greater information available at our fingertips on the
Internet, “[o]nline diversity is astonishingly shallow.”161 Because of the
problem of reliability on the Internet, people typically prefer news
companies that have proven themselves, which usually means “old media”
news companies.162 Since web users often use just a few successful sites,
this makes it more difficult for diverse viewpoints to be explored.163
While technology could potentially better serve minority audiences,
156. Press Release, USC Annenberg Sch. for Comm. & Journalism, 2010 USC
Annenberg Digital Future Study Finds Strong Negative Reaction to Paying for Online
Services (July 23, 2010), http://www.digitalcenter.org/pdf/2010_digital_future_final_
release.pdf.
157. KLINENBERG, supra note 4,at 193.
158. Id. at 177.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 178.
161. Matthew Hindman, A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep: Measuring Media Diversity
Online and Offline, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS, supra note
5, at 327, 329.
162. See KLINENBERG, supra note 4, at 179.
163. Hindman, supra note 161, at 329.
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it has yet to prove itself. Computer literacy and Internet access remain
barriers for minority audiences, and the Internet remains limited in
providing various reliable sources. Even though we as a society should
promote education in all communities to learn how to use new technologies
as they become available, we should not wait on a future technology to be
our saving grace. Technology should not be used to deflect the
insufficiency of other media to serve minority audiences and to produce
diverse programming.

C.

Bringing Back Regulation and Implications of the Fairness
Doctrine

Traditionally, there have been two main approaches to achieving
diversity in the media: an open market approach and a regulatory
approach.164 However, the consolidation of the media industry in the last
three decades demonstrates that the market approach has not served
minority audiences and the ability to create more diverse programming.
Therefore, the FCC needs to bring back a regulatory approach that focuses
not only on ownership but also on the standards of programming and how
that programming is brought to fruition by means other than strictly
advertising.
The market approach, which is the approach the FCC has adopted
primarily in the last three decades, stands for the efficient use of market
forces to create diverse voices in media and society by allowing media
companies to compete and determine the amount of programming desired
by the market.165 Efficiency in the market results by allowing media
companies to be free from government regulation so that they may create
diverse choices as the market demands it.166 In order to obtain efficiency,
media companies have structured themselves into vertically integrated
organizations, which allow them to achieve scale economies because “costs
can be amortized over many products rather than a single product.”167 In
addition, “economies of scope168 are achieved when a company produces
multiple products that are in some way compatible,” such as selling DVDs
and books that complement television shows produced by a media
company.169 Achieving economies of scope allows Big Media companies to
164. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 2.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. A vertically integrated organization is an “organization that integrates processes
from production through distribution.” Id.
168. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268,
268 (1981) (“There are economies of scope where it is less costly to combine two or more
product lines in one firm than to produce them separately.”).
169. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 2.
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“produc[e] similar content over many forms[,]” which allows them to
“more efficiently produce a profit.”170
Opponents of a strict market approach argue that by media companies
organizing in vertically integrated structures, it makes it more difficult for
new media competitors to enter the competitive market because “[m]ultiple
stage entry is always more costly, difficult, and risky than single stage
entry.”171 Therefore, the vertical integration structure leads to a few
corporations, or “media monopolies,” dominating the marketplace and
“restricting marketplace diversity” by denying access to different
viewpoints.172
The regulatory approach proposes that government regulation is the
only way to promote social needs such as creating diversity.173 If left
strictly to the market, “pro-social programming” would not be created
because private companies would not want to risk their ability to make a
profit over working toward the public interest.174 Since the broadcast
system is based on advertising, which is determined by the size of the
audience, producers create programs that will appeal to a majority
audience.175 As a result, in order to achieve the largest possible audience,
programming will not account for “minority tastes.”176 The reason this is a
problem for achieving diversity in media is because multinational
corporations that depend on other multinational corporations (advertisers)
for profits are the ones that decide what will be communicated to
audiences.177
The FCC has used ownership regulation as a way to regulate content.
However, with the deregulation of media, ownership caps have expanded
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3 (quotation omitted); see also Kurt A. Wimmer, The Future of Minority
Advocacy Before the FCC: Using Marketplace Rhetoric to Urge Policy Change, 41 FED.
COMM. L.J. 133, 137, 142–43 (1989) (noting that “[u]nder the theory of marketplace
regulation, the FCC has a self-imposed responsibility to intervene in markets that have
failed” and that the “market has failed minority audiences . . . . because the advertisers that
subsidize television programming perceive minorities as a less desirable audience[,]” which
therefore requires“[a] properly configured system of regulation [that] would empower the
viewer and might remedy a market failure by encouraging broadcasters to serve their
minority audiences more effectively”); William A. Wines & Terence J. Lau, Can You Hear
Me Now?—Corporate Censorship and Its Troubling Implications for the First Amendment,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 119, 167 (2005) (“A recognition that the market approach to allocating a
media spectrum has failed and a return to antitrust enforcement of media consolidation
might also be fruitful.”).
172. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 3.
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 3.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 5.
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and have essentially barred the ability of smaller program producers to
enter media. Even if minority owners were able to break through the barrier
of vertically integrated companies, they would still face barriers produced
by advertisers because advertisers place limits on the type of programming
to be produced.178 Perhaps the solution is in reaching programming.
Although regulating programming runs the risk of violating the First
Amendment, examples from other countries demonstrate that democracies
have been able to require certain percentages of programming instead of
requiring specific content. For instance, Western European countries have
regulated the percentage of cultural, educational, and entertainment
programming.179 “In the Netherlands, 25% of programming is dedicated to
culture, 25% to information, 25% to entertainment, and 5% to
education.”180 Likewise, Ireland requires radio stations to have news and
current affairs comprise 20% of their programming.181 The only example in
the United States where content has been mandated is in the Children’s
Television Act, which enabled the FCC to require that three hours of
children’s programming be made available on the public airwaves.182
Broadcasters are viewed as public trustees because they impact public
airwaves with their broadcast license.183 Since broadcasters are required to
serve the public interest, we may view programming obligations as part of
public rights.184 Many view pro-society programming as the type of
programming that is often on public television, such as “children’s
programming, public affairs programming, arts programming,
documentaries, [and] nature programming.”185 Although public television
does provide more pro-society programming compared to broadcast

178. Id. at 212.
179. Id. at 211.
180. Id. (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 212 (citation omitted).
182. Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, §§ 101–03, 104 Stat. 996
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)–(b) (2006)). § 303(b)(a) states that the FCC “shall, in its
review of any application for renewal of a commercial or noncommercial television
broadcast license, consider the extent to which the licensee . . . has served the educational
and informational needs of children through the licensee’s overall programming, including
programming specifically designed to serve such needs.” See also Policies and Rules
Concerning Children’s Television Programming, Revision of Programming Policies for
Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660, para. 120 (1996)
(stating that “the Mass Media Bureau will be authorized to approve the Children's
Television Act portions of a broadcaster’s renewal application where the broadcaster has
aired three hours per week . . . of educational and informational programming that has as a
significant purpose serving the educational and informational needs of children ages 16 and
under”).
183. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 212.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 219.
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network and cable networks, public television faces “increasing costs,
increasing competition from cable networks and decreasing public
spending.”186 Therefore, public television has come to rely on advertisers in
the same way as for-profit broadcasters in order to supplement public funds
it receives and funds from individual subscribers.187 Because all media
producers rely on this method of financing its programs, the FCC should
reinstate its ascertainment requirements. By laying out specific standards
for programming, such as the FCC did previously with the fourteen criteria
ascertainment requirements in the 1960s, broadcasters will be required to
serve communities’ needs and include the interests of minority audiences in
their programming decisions while lessening the pressures of advertisers to
dictate the content of programming.
If the FCC were to proceed with regulations promoting more diverse
programming to serve minority audiences, such as ascertainment
requirements, then concerns might arise that the FCC would be doing so in
order to push certain viewpoints in broadcasting. Such regulations may
bring about concerns about a resurgence of the Fairness Doctrine. Despite
assertions by President Obama and FCC Commissioner Michael Copps that
they do not support reinstating the Fairness Doctrine,188 conservative
politicians and critics—fearing that the Obama Administration and
Congress would reinstate the Fairness Doctrine in order to contain
conservative talk radio—introduced bills in both houses to keep the
Fairness Doctrine from reemerging.189 On February 26, 2009, the Senate
voted to ban the reinstatement of the Fairness Doctrine by adding a rider—
“S.Amdt. 573: To prevent the Federal Communications Commission from
repromulgating the fairness doctrine”—to the D.C. Voting Rights Bill:
Broadcaster Freedom Act.190 These efforts demonstrate that the Fairness
Doctrine is not likely to return.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 3–4; see White House: Obama Opposes
‘Fairness
Doctrine’
Revival,
FOXNEWS.COM
(Feb.
18,
2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/first100days/2009/02/18/white-house-opposes-fairnessdoctrine/ (noting that White House spokesman Ben LaBolt told FoxNews.com, “As the
president stated during the campaign, he does not believe the Fairness Doctrine should be
reinstated”); Matt Cover, Acting FCC Chair Sees Government Role in Pushing ‘Media
Diversity,’ CNSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/43414
(stating that Copps believed the Fairness Doctrine “didn’t need to be rehashed”).
189. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 3; see, e.g., Broadcaster Freedom Act of 2009,
S. 34, 111th Cong. (2009); Broadcaster Freedom Act of 2009, S. 62, 111th Cong. (2009);
Broadcaster Freedom Act of 2009, H.R. 226, 111th Cong. (2009).
190. S. 160: District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-160&tab=amendments (last visited
Apr. 14, 2011).
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Although President Obama and Commissioner Copps stated they
opposed the Fairness Doctrine, both have made statements regarding the
need for media diversity. For instance, President Obama, as a then-acting
Senator, wrote a joint article with Senator John Kerry that stated, “As we
look toward the future, we must ensure that all voices in our diverse nation
have the opportunity to be heard. One important way to do this is to expand
the ownership stake of women-owned, minority-owned and small
businesses in our media outlets. . . . The FCC has an obligation to promote
the public interest, including diversity in media ownership.”191
Commissioner Copps, formerly acting as Chairman, stated that he believed
the government has a role in enforcing media diversity.192 In a speech to the
Future of Music Coalition, Commissioner Copps stated that in order “to
ensure that the public airwaves truly deliver the kind of news and
information that we need to sustain our democratic dialogue and to reflect
the great diversity of our country [we need] to make sure that these goals . .
. remain at the center [of] the national agenda.”193 In response to the
“excessive” media consolidation, Commissioner Copps noted a more
regulatory approach may be needed:
Sometimes . . . markets create problems, and boy have they created
some whoppers this time . . . . Sometimes we need the government to
step in and provide some oversight and some public accountability and
if we learn one lesson from our present national crisis, that ought to be
it.194

Commissioner Copps further stated, “[i]f markets cannot produce what
society really cares about, like a media that reflects the true diversity and
spirit of our country, then government has a legitimate role to play.”195
In response to the role that government must play in expanding media
diversity, the Senate adopted the Durbin Amendment.196 Proposed by
Senator Durbin, it was adopted by Senate Amendment 591 to the D.C.
House Voting Rights Act (S.160).197 The amendment states that the FCC
“shall take action to encourage and promote diversity in communication
media ownership.”198
191. Barack Obama & John F. Kerry, Media Consolidation Silences Diverse Voices,
POLITICO (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1107/6758.html.
192. Cover, supra note 188.
193. Id. (quotation omitted).
194. Id. (quotation omitted).
195. Id. (quotation omitted).
196. Senate Adopts Durbin FCC Diversity Amendment to D.C. Voting Rights Bill,
SENATUS (Feb. 26, 2009, 1:29 PM) http://senatus.wordpress.com/2009/02/26/senate-adoptsdurbin-fcc-diversity-amendment-to-dc-voting-rights-bill/ [hereinafter SENATUS].
197. Bill Summary & Status: 111th Congress (2009–2010) S.AMDT.591, LIBR. CONG.,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SP591 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
198. SENATUS, supra note 196.
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Critics claim this is promoting a new Fairness Doctrine.199
Republicans worry that the broad language of the amendment will lead to
the implementation of the Fairness Doctrine later in time.200 On the other
hand, Democrats counter that the amendment does not mention the Fairness
Doctrine, and it would work to ensure that those with a broadcast license
work to promote the public interest.201
It seems very unlikely that the Fairness Doctrine will make a return;
however, this does not mean that the promotion of diversity in the
communications industry should be completely abandoned. In addition,
changing media ownership rules to reflect more diversity does not
constitute censorship.
Since the very beginning of broadcast regulation, the FCC has
maintained limits on the number of stations one company may own in
a local community and the number they may own nationally, to ensure
diversity. While media companies would prefer to get larger, there is
no plausible argument that ownership limits censor content.”202

The onslaught of media deregulation and court rulings has led to a
media industry dominated by big business and the survival of the fittest (or
those with the deepest pockets) in an economic market. So what chance
does diverse programming have in this grim reality? In order to ensure the
role of diversity in the communications industry, the government must take
a stronger role in its promotion. Policies advancing minority ownership
should continue to be promoted. In addition, since diverse programming
has difficulty thriving because it must compete in economically demanding
markets in which advertisers and Big Media rule the roost, regulation
should focus on changing the means of financing ownership. The broadcast
industry’s reliance “on advertising for its financial support” (especially that

199. Matt Cover, Durbin: ‘Right-Wing’ Radio Hosts Wave ‘Bloody Shirt’ over
(Mar.
11,
2009),
Broadcast
Censorship,
CNSNEWS.COM
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/44895; see also, e.g., Seton Motley, Essay: The
Durbin Amendment–The New ‘Fairness’ Doctrine with a Kicker, NEWSBUSTERS.ORG (Feb.
27, 2009), http://newsbusters.org/blogs/seton-motley/2009/02/27/essay-durbin-amendmentnew-fairness-doctrine-kicker; Jim DeMint, TWITTER (Feb. 26, 2009, 11:43 AM),
http://twitter.com/JimDeMint/status/1254977388 (quoting a tweet by Republican Senator
Jim DeMint of South Carolina, who proposed a counter amendment to the Durbin
Amendment, “We have closed the front door on Fairness Doctrine, but Durbin amend opens
back door to censorship. The fight goes on”); Conn Carroll, Morning Bell: The Durbin
Doctrine’s Assault on Free Speech, FOUNDRY: CONSERVATIVE POL’Y NEWS BLOG (Mar. 16,
2009, 8:07 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2009/03/16/morning-bell-the-durbin-doctrineassault-on-free-speech/ (stating that Senator Durbin “knows that reinstating the old Fairness
Doctrine is a non-starter so he has come up with a new but equally pernicious law that will
accomplish the exact same thing”).
200. SENATUS, supra note 196.
201. Id.
202. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 6.
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of television) has been argued to “lead[] to limited diversity.”203 In order to
expand minority ownership and diversity, “we need a more mixed system
of mass media with different mandates and different modes of
financing.”204 Finally, rather than allow advertisers to dictate content, the
FCC needs to bring back regulation that promotes diverse programming,
such as ascertainment requirements, so that broadcasters have standards for
serving minority audiences like they serve their nonminority audiences.

IV. CONCLUSION
A high-ranking studio executive once noted, “It’s an awfully white
world on television.”205 This “awfully white world” aptly describes the
landscape of today’s American media. The current state of American media
reflects the interests of Big Media corporations who rule the audience’s
intake of information. Despite the fallacy that we have more information in
a constantly developing technological age, much of the information we
acquire consists of condensed and recycled stories. In a democracy that
relies on having an informed public, how can we truly feel informed when
we have to rely on a handful of major media companies to send the
information to us in as many mediums as they can reach us? By bringing
back regulation, the FCC can ensure the public interest is served and that
minority audiences are not continuously neglected.
The evolution of diversity in media has seen many highs and many
lows, but at the moment it seems stagnant. With the FCC’s 1978 Statement
of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, we saw the
potential for the advancement of minority ownership in broadcast as a way
of promoting diversity in the marketplace of ideas. However, after Supreme
Court decisions in Metro Broadcasting and Adarand, we saw the Court
limiting government action that would be deemed to be providing benefits
due to racial classifications. Furthermore, the opportunity for minority
ownership seemed to be further slashed by the unprecedented media
consolidation that resulted from relaxed ownership regulations by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the FCC’s 2003 Report and Order.
Although the FCC attempted to provide a Diversity Index that would assist
in measuring local markets and their ability to put out diverse viewpoints,
the Diversity Index has been deemed an insufficient remedy in the wake of
Prometheus Radio Project. In response, the FCC adopted the 2008
Broadcast Diversity Order, but we have yet to see full implementation of
the proposals adopted to assist minority media owners.
203. See EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 4.
204. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 41.
205. Greg Braxton, A White, White World on TV’s Fall Schedule, L.A. TIMES (May 28,
1999), available at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/may/28/news/mn-41995.
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The FCC needs to bring back regulation. Rather than allow a handful
of major companies to dominate the content received by our local
audiences, the FCC should continue to focus on minority media ownership.
As of 2005, “only 3.6 percent of all broadcast radio and television stations
were minority-owned, while a mere 3.4 percent were owned by women.”206
Although it is not guaranteed that minority ownership will always result in
diverse programming, we should defer to the FCC’s long standing history
in believing it will improve the likelihood of diverse programming in the
aggregate.
Media policies promoting minority ownership should continue, but
they should not be the only way to achieve diverse programming. Rather,
the FCC should also consider regulations that focus on programming itself,
such as bringing back ascertainment requirements, as a way to control how
programming is determined. Although developing technologies, such as the
Internet, could serve minority audiences, many barriers still exist that keep
this technology from being used to its full potential. In order to ensure that
the needs of all audiences are served, the FCC needs to lay out standards
for broadcasters so that they meet the needs of their communities. Only by
looking to the communities broadcasters serve can programming become
diversified and reflect interests that are inclusive of minority audiences as
well as nonminority audiences.

206. KLINENBERG, supra note 4, at 28.
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